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Financialisation, financial development, and investment: evidence from 
European non-financial corporations 
Abstract: This article provides estimations of the effects of different financial channels on 
physical investment in Europe using the balance sheets of publicly listed non-financial 
corporations (NFCs) for the period 1995-2015. The evidence suggests that both financial 
payments and financial income have an adverse effect on investment in fixed assets. The 
negative impacts of increasing financial income are non-linear with respect to company 
size: they crowd out investment in large companies, and have a positive effect on the 
investment of relatively smaller companies. Similar to the recent literature on finance-
growth nexus, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between financial development 
and companies’ investment. However, in contrast to the existing literature, we also find 
that a higher degree of financial development in the country is associated with a stronger 
negative effect of financial income on investment.  
Keywords: financialisation, financial development, non-financial corporations, fixed 
investment, Europe  
JEL codes: C23, G31, D21 
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1. Introduction
The impact of financial markets on investment is an empirically contested area of research. 
Several prominent contributions assert that financial markets facilitate the financing and the 
efficient allocation of investment (King and Levine, 1993; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; 
Beck et al., 2000; Love, 2003; Levine, 2005). In particular, these studies try to test the 
strength of this relationship by employing an index of financial development that aims at 
capturing the level of development of both intermediaries and financial markets (see 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 1996; Beck et al., 2010). However, Arestis and Demetriades 
(1997) advocate caution regarding these results, which do not take into account institutional 
peculiarities. Moreover, the effect of stock market development on growth is found to be 
weaker than that of the banking sector (Arestis et al., 2001). Recently after the 2007-2008 
crisis, the impact of the disproportionate growth of the financial system has been widely 
questioned (see among others Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Beck et al., 2014; Law and 
Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015). In particular, Law and Singh (2014) and Arcand et al. 
(2015) argue that there is a ‘threshold effect’ in the relationship between the growth of 
financial activities and macroeconomic growth; thus the expansion of the financial system is 
beneficial to growth only up to a point (e.g. the ratio of the financial sector to GDP should not 
exceed 100%). Cournède et al. (2015) in an OECD study and Sahay et al. (2015) in an IMF 
note argue that further financial development in the advanced economies is likely to increase 
both economic and financial instability.   
In the analysis of investment and financial development, non-financial companies’ 
financial activities are not directly taken into account. Back in the 1950s, Robinson (1952:86) 
stated ‘where enterprise leads finance follows’, describing a financial system that was merely 
supporting trajectories already planned by the real economy. In contrast, recent structural 
changes mark the growing prominence of the ‘financial motives’ over the traditional 
purposes of the firm related to investment in fixed assets associated with their core activities 
(Epstein, 2005). Instead of being just a vehicle for more efficient production plans, in recent 
decades financial activities have grown more than the financing requirements of the rest of 
the economy (Krippner, 2005). This new configuration raises the question of how this 
change has affected investment decisions in the non-financial sector.  
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The ‘financialisation’ of the economy is summarised as an ongoing and self-
reinforcing economic and social process that manifests itself in the growing prominence and 
influence of behaviours derived from the financial sector (Epstein, 2005; Carruthers, 2015). 
Following van der Zwan (2014), we highlight three main features of this process: a) a 
new regime of accumulation largely shaped around financial motives; b) the consolidation 
of the ‘shareholder value’ as the key principle in corporate governance; and c) the 
dissemination of practices linked to finance within everyday life (pension schemes, 
mortgages provision, healthcare etc.). This article aims at contributing to the understanding 
of the impact of the first two aspects of financialisation on the investment of non-financial 
corporations (henceforth NFCs).  
Since the 1980s, there has been a slowdown in investment and growth along with a 
rise in the interest and dividend payments of non-financial corporations in advanced 
economies (Stockhammer, 2004; 2006). Consequently, companies have experienced a 
significant reduction in available internal funds for physical investments. Despite an 
expanding theoretical literature on the effects of this phenomenon, the empirical evidence is 
predominantly relegated to a macroeconomic perspective, especially in the case of the 
impact of financialisation on investment. The origins of the theoretical microeconomic 
analysis of the relationship between finance and investment can be traced back to the works 
of Fazzari and Mott (1986) and Ndikumana (1999). Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2015) provide 
evidence about the negative effect of increased financial investment by non-financial firms 
on total value added and hence economic growth. Alvarez (2015) focuses on the relationship 
between financialisation and functional income distribution in the context of French 
corporations using firm-level data. Akkemik and Özen (2013) analyse the effects of 
institutional context at the national level on the financialisation of Turkish firms, finding that 
macroeconomic uncertainty has been a key driver of this process. In a similar vein, Soener 
(2015) identifies the drivers of US firms’ financialisation at the industry level, arguing that 
the specific organisational features of firms can influence their ‘likelihood of financialising’. 
Baud and Durand (2012) also analyse financialisation at the industry level, in particular 
highlighting the role of internationalisation and financial operations by leading international 
retailers. To the best of our knowledge, only Orhangazi (2008), Demir (2009), Tori and 
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Onaran (2018), and Davis (2018) analyse directly the effects of financialisation on 
investment at the firm level from a microeconomic perspective. 
This paper has two novelties. First, it explores the interactions between increasing 
financial development (henceforth FD, defined conventionally as the financial markets and 
intermediaries activities in the country) and the effect of financial income and payments on 
NFCs’ investment. Second, it provides the first micro-econometric evidence for a large 
sample of European NFCs on the effects of increasing financialisation on investment using 
firm-level balance sheet data from the Worldscope database. This particular database allows 
us to build a consistent measure for companies’ financialisation regarding both inflows and 
outflows.   
This paper combines two strands of literature, namely the one focusing on firms’ 
financing constraints and the one focusing on the non-operating activities of non-financial 
firms, and presents alternative specifications of the investment functions to be estimated. 
Our aims are to provide estimations of the effects of different financial channels on physical 
investment in Europe using the balance sheets of publicly listed non-financial corporations 
(NFCs) for the period 1995-2015. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 
2 discusses the key theoretical and empirical contributions in the literature. Section 3 
presents the alternative specifications of the investment functions to be estimated. Section 4 
discusses the data and the stylised facts of our sample. Section 5 presents the estimation 
methodology. Section 6 discusses our estimation results. Section 7 concludes.  
2. Investment, liquidity, and financial motives
In the earlier ‘accelerator investment models’ (e.g. Kuh and Meyer, 1955; Evans, 1967) 
firms’ capital expenditure was almost entirely modelled as a function of expected 
profitability measured by sales. In contrast, the early neoclassical approach modelled the 
firm's investment decision as a static maximisation problem of discounted flows of profits 
over an infinite time horizon (Jorgenson, ; 1971). As an alternative, investment models 
based on the maximisation of the expected cash flows (or market value) in the presence of 
adjustment costs and expectations, which take the dynamic process explicitly into account, 
have been proposed (Chirinko, 1993). Within this group, the so-called ‘Q model’ of Brainard 
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and Tobin (1968), which models investment using Tobin's Q variable, defined as the ratio of 
the firm’s stock market valuation to its capital replacement cost, has been widely used. 
However, firm-level empirical analysis has failed to provide evidence of the strong 
explanatory power of the Q variable (Hayashi and Inoue, 1991; Bond et al., 1992). 
Explanations of this finding focused on the bias of the stock market evaluation due to 
asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and periodic ‘financial bubbles’ (Bond 
and Cummins, 2001; Bond et al., 2004). But more important, as argued by Hubbard (1998), 
the source of financing matter for investment. Empirical evidence shows that cashflows, i.e. 
internal funds, are important determinants of investment (Fazzari et al., 1988; Blundell et 
al., 1992; Brown et al., 2009). Fazzari et al. (1988) show that fluctuations in internal finance, 
as reflected by cashflows, are statistically more important than the stock market valuation 
in determining investment. Liquidity constraints play a crucial role (Fazzari and Petersen, 
1993; Chirinko and Schaller, 1995). The effect of cash flow on investment is significantly 
positive and robust especially in the case of cash constrained firms (Denis and Sibilkov, 
2010), whilst the effects of the stock market evaluation and debt are mixed (Bond and 
Meghir, 1994; Bond et al., 2003; Bloom et al., 2007). However, previous findings about the 
sensitivity of investment to financing constraints have been subject to debate.1  
A strong strand in the investment literature argues that companies’ financing issues 
mainly derive from different degrees of agency problems (see among others Whited, 1992), 
and the development of financial markets can relax these constraints (Love, 2003; Pawlina 
and Renneboog, 2005; Love and Zicchino, 2006; Guariglia and Carpenter, 2008). In 
particular, Beck et al. (2005) find that firms with higher financing obstacles exhibit slower 
growth, but this relationship is weaker in countries with relatively more developed financial 
systems, and FD is more effective in alleviating financing constraints especially for smaller 
firms. However, both the statistical significance and size of the estimates vary widely due to 
methodological heterogeneity (Valickova et al., 2015; Arestis et al., 2015). 
In the last few decades, the integration between the ‘financial’ and ‘real’ sides of the 
economy has increased substantially along with the rising influence of financial markets and 
financial motives on economic decisions (Epstein, 2005; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011). 
However, the increasing involvement of the NFCs in finance-related activities is analysed 
primarily as a consequence of a change in corporate governance (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 
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2000). Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2015), discuss the shift in management preferences caused 
by the rise in hostile takeovers, with the consequence of an alignment between pay 
structures and shareholders’ interests. Knafo and Dutta (2016:771) explain how 
‘financialised management’ and shareholder value have their origin in the US conglomerate 
movement in the 1960s, in which financial markets were used ‘as a baseline for strategy, and 
the emphasis on financial transactions as an engine for growth.’ From the early 1980s 
onwards, there has been an increased orientation towards maximising ‘shareholder value’ 
(Rappaport, 1999). Both the practices of distributing dividends and boosting share prices 
through share buyback operations has gained importance in this new era (De Ridder, 2009). 
Furthermore, firms find investing in reversible short-term financial assets an attractive 
alternative to irreversible long-term fixed investment, and thereby the increased availability 
of financial assets may crowd out physical investment in core activities.2  
Regarding the firm-level effect of finance on investment, Fazzari and Mott (1986) 
model investment as a function of sales, internal finance and interest payments. In another 
microeconomic investment model, Ndikumana (1999) finds negative effects of both stock 
and flows of debt. Firm’s indebtedness not only reduces cash flow (via interest payments), 
but also affects the sustainability of investments. However, these studies do not model the 
impact of financial revenues, which is an important dimension of firms’ current behaviour.  
To the best of our knowledge, only four empirical papers explicitly analyse the impact 
of different financial activities on investment from a microeconomic perspective.3 Orhangazi 
(2008) has been the first to provide an econometric analysis of the effect of financialisation 
on the investment behaviour of the NFCs. He analyses a sample of US firms during the period 
1973-2003 and finds a significant and negative effect of financial payments on investment. 
With respect to financial incomes, Orhangazi tests whether higher profits from financial 
activities drive a change in management priorities, in which firms prefer short-term 
reversible financial investments to long-term fixed ones. Demir (2009) estimates investment 
as a function of the gap between the rates of return of fixed and financial assets for a sample 
of NFCs in Argentina, Mexico and Turkey in the 1990s, and finds that increasing returns on 
financial assets reduces fixed investment of the industrial sector. Tori and Onaran (2018) 
focus on the UK NFCs, finding negative effects of both financial payments and incomes on 
investment, which have been especially strong in the manufacturing sector and in the pre-
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2007 crisis period. Davis (2018) analyses US firms from 1971 to 2013 and finds that while 
shareholder pressure has a negative effect on companies’ investment, the accumulation of 
financial assets has, on average, a positive effect on accumulation.  
3. Specifications of the model
Investment is an intrinsically dynamic process (Bond and Meghir, 1994; Lopez and Mott, 
1999) and there is a path dependency which links past and future levels of investment. 
Therefore, in line with the literature, our specification includes lagged investment as an 
explanatory variable (Ford and Poret, 1991; Kopcke and Brauman, 2001; Orhangazi, 2008). 
Additionally, all other explanatory variables are lagged in order to depict the ‘adjustment 
processes. 
To capture the potential effects of two key financialisation channels, we start from a 
specification similar to Orhangazi (2008).  Equation (1) presents our specification, where the 
rate of accumulation of capital (investment/capital), I/K, is:   
where I is the addition to fixed assets, K is the net capital stock, S is net sales, π is net 
operating income and CD is cash dividends paid. F is the sum of cash dividends and interest 
paid on debt, 𝜋𝐹 is the total non-operating (financial) income as the sum of interest and 
dividends received by the company, and Q stands for Tobin’s Q.4 i is the firm identifier, 𝛽𝑡 
identifies a set of time-dummies to control for unobservable time-specific effects common to 
all firms in the different estimations, whilst the standard disturbance term εit captures firm-
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All variables are lagged to reflect the time consideration in the investment plans. The 
operating income minus dividends as a ratio to fixed assets is a measure of the profit rate 
based on retained earnings. Dividend payments are deducted in order to reflect the 
availability of internal funds.5 The sales/fixed assets ratio is a proxy reflecting capacity 
utilisation.6 Financial payments/fixed assets and non-operating income/fixed assets are the 
two measures of the impact of financialisation. Variable descriptions are in Table 1A in the 
appendix. We expect positive effects of the lagged investment, profit rate, and sales on 
investment. F reflects the financial outflows, while πF  reflects the financial inflows. In the 
light of the microeconomic literature discussed above, the impact of total financial payments 
(or ‘cash commitments’) is expected to be negative. In this model, cash dividends are 
conceived both as a reduction of available internal funds, and as reflecting behavioural 
changes due to the ‘shareholder value orientation’ (henceforth SVO) as suggested by 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000). The composite measure for outward financialisation, F, is 
the sum of interest and dividend payments (as a ratio to K), capturing: a) the liquidity effect 
of interest payments reflecting the effect of the increase in external means of financing; and 
b) the additional behavioural effect of the SVO. Not only do NFCs use part of their funds to
pay interest and dividends to the financial sector, but they can also pursue non-operating 
financial investment themselves, more than ever before, thus receiving financial income. We 
include the sum of interests and dividends received by the NFCs (πF)  as a ratio to K as an 
explanatory variable.7 Theoretically, the sign of the effect of financial income on investment 
is ambiguous. On the one hand, these incomes may have a positive impact on investment in 
fixed assets by easing the liquidity constraint faced by firms. In particular, this can be the 
case for relatively smaller companies, which are more likely to experience liquidity 
restrictions compared to larger corporations. The heterogeneity in the levels of liquidity 
constraints with respect to firms’ size has been widely confirmed in the literature (see Evans 
and Jovanovic, 1989; Fazzari et al., 1988; Chirinko, 1993). On the other hand, financialisation 
can also be detrimental to physical investment, since the NFCs will be attracted by short-
term, reversible financial investment, instead of engaging in long-term, irreversible physical 
investment. In order to explore the potentially different effect of financial payments in small 









































































+ ∑ 𝜷𝟕(𝑸)𝒊𝒕−𝒋 +
𝟐
𝒋=𝟏
 𝜷𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
(2) 
where the dummy variable Dn takes the value 1 if the average total assets of company i lies in 
the lower n percentile of the distribution, and takes the value 0 otherwise. In our estimations, 
this size-dummy is interacted with the financial income, as well as the other explanatory 
variables. In this specification, while β4 is the effect of financial income in the larger companies, 
β4 + β4.1  capture the effect of financial income in the smaller companies. In addition, the effect 
of financial income on the NFCs’ investment can differ depending on the degree of FD of the 
country in which the NFCs are based.   This paper analyses the potential non-linearity in the 
relationship between the development of the financial system and physical investment by 
estimating the impact of the NFCs financial income on investment at different levels of financial 
development. The financial system acts as a provider of long-term liquidity to finance 
investment but, when its size and development are detached from the requirements of the real 
sector, a perverse effect may emerge. In fact, NFCs may take advantage of a growing and 
developing a financial system to engage more in non-operating financial activities, causing a 
negative effect on their core capital accumulation. Equation (3) aims at exploring this 
additional effect. The variable for financial income ( 
𝜋𝐹
𝐾
) is interacted with the dummy 
variable 𝐷𝐿𝐹𝐷 . The latter takes the value 1 if company i is located in a country with a relatively 
low level of FD, and takes the value 0 otherwise (i.e. if company i is located in a country with a 
















































































+ ∑ 𝜷𝟕(𝑸)𝒊𝒕−𝒋 +
𝟐
𝒋=𝟏
 𝜷𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
(3) 
In order to split our sample into countries with low and high financial development, 
we refer to the index proposed by Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (1996) also used in Love 
(2003) and in Love and Zicchino (2006) among others.8 Even though more disaggregated 
indices have been introduced (see Beck et al., 2010), in our case the traditional version is 
preferable for two reasons: first, this index is more parsimonious and help us in interpreting 
the results. Second, in line with the aim of this study, we are interested in the ‘depth’ of the 
financial sector. Although important, the efficiency and stability of the financial system used 
in other indices are less relevant categories in this respect. If a country has an FD index above 
(below) the median, it will be considered to have a high-developed (low-developed) financial 
system.9  
The fourth specification that will be estimated is an integration of equation (2) and (3). 
The effects of financial income and financial payments interact with both the size-dummy 
and FD-dummy. For simplicity, the effect of operating income and debt interact with just the 
FD-dummy. This specification allows us to estimate consistently the impact of our variables 































































































 ∑ 𝜷𝟕(𝑸)𝒊𝒕−𝒋 +
𝟐
𝒋=𝟏
 𝜷𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕
(4) 
In the case of financial income, the estimated coefficient β4 will correspond to the effect 
of this variable for companies lying in the top 80% of the distribution in terms of total assets, 
which also are in a country with high FD. The estimated coefficient β4.1 will be the effect of 
financial income in the companies in the top 80% of the size distribution but based in 
countries with low FD. Coefficient β4.2 will reveal the effect of this variable in relatively 
smaller companies (i.e. the lowest 20% of the size distribution), irrespective of their location 
in terms of FD. The remaining two effects are computed as follows: the impact of financial 
income in companies in the lowest 20% of the size distribution in countries with high FD is 
equal to 𝛽4 + 𝛽4.2.  𝛽4 + 𝛽4.1 + 𝛽4.2  is the effect of financial income in relatively smaller 
companies, in countries with low FD. The same logic applies to financial payments.10   
The fifth and last specification aims at testing the effects of financial development on 
NFCs’ investment by introducing on-linearity in its effects using the FD index as a continuous 
variable. This specification takes into account both the effects of the ‘financialisation 
variables’ on firm investment and the possible non-linear effects of financial development.  
The terms FD and FD-squared are included to test for the so-called ‘threshold effect’ of 



















































 𝜷𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
(5) 
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of NFCs’ fixed investment, i.e. to test for the existence of a non-linear ‘parabola’ relationship 
between the firm-level investment and country-level financial development. The signs of the 
two coefficients for FD and FD-squared will determine whether the relationship is concave 
or convex. 
With equations (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) we aim at introducing novel models of firm-
level investment that a) take into account the inherent irreversibility of physical investment, 
b) control for the independent effect of profitability and demand, c) highlight the effects of
financialisation, d) make a clear distinction between operating and non-operating activities, 
and e) treat financial outflows and inflows, i.e. both outward and inward financialisation, as 
fundamental determinants. 
4. Data and stylised facts
Our sample consists of companies in the following western European countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.11 The focus on these countries has been informed by 
the fact that they are the ‘old members’ of the European Union and are mature capitalist 
market economies, hence they can provide a comprehensive picture about the evolution 
and integration of the investment and financialisation processes in core European 
countries. Our data is based on the Worldscope database of publicly listed firms’ balance 
sheets, thus we have not considered non-listed companies. Although analysing non-listed 
firms could also be interesting, we focus on publicly listed ones for two main reasons: first, 
the literature recognises publicly listed corporations as those most affected by the process 
of financialisation. Second, the availability and quality of data for the publicly listed 
companies are higher, thus empirically superior given the purposes of this study. 
Standardised data on financial payments and, in particular, financial income are difficult to 
find; our database allows us to have a comprehensive variable for our analysis. The 
Worldscope database has been acknowledged as a valuable source in the literature on firm-
level investment analysis (e.g. Cleary 1999; Love, 2003; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; 
Love and Zicchino, 2006). Our data are annual for the period of 1995-2015. 
We used annual data for the period of 1995-2015 for all the active public non-
financial companies in the countries listed above. We thus exclude financial firms, identified 
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by the primary Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes from 6000 to 6799. The primary 
SIC code (variable WC07021) is the one commonly used in the literature to identify a 
company’s main sector of operation. Worldscope provides alternative codes for the 
identification of the main field of operation of the companies included in the database. We 
thus checked the consistency between the primary SIC code, the primary Industrial 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) code (WC07040), and the Thomson Reuters Business 
Classification (TRBC) code (WC07041) to inform the exclusion of financial companies. We 
excluded companies that were classified as non-financial according to SIC, but as financial 
according to either ICB or TRBC. Only twenty-five companies presented this inconsistency, 
and were thus excluded from our sample. 
The identification of companies’ effective country of operation is another important 
aspect, although a consensus about how to assess it has not been reached within the 
literature on firm-level analysis.  We opted for the standard Worldscope variable ‘nation 
code’ (WC06027) to identify a company’s country. The database’s guide explains that this 
variable identifies the country in which the company is domiciled, meaning the place where 
corporate principal affairs of business are maintained. In addition, the database potentially 
provides further information about a company’s nationality, referring to the geographical 
distribution of different balance sheet items (e.g. sales, capital expenditure, and operating 
income). However, data availability about these variables for our set of countries and time 
period was poor, overall, and did not allow us to perform a robustness check in this sense. 
We thus run a consistency check similar to the one described above, this time using 
alternative variables from Datastream, namely ‘LOC’ (code local), and ‘GEOG’ (geography 
group). Only five companies presented an inconsistency and have been thus excluded. 
It is well known that the presence of outliers usually characterises firm-level data. To 
prevent biased estimations, we apply a data screening process which excludes extreme 
outliers from the sample.12 Firms should have at least three consecutive observations for the 
dependent variable (I/K), a condition also required for econometric purposes (Roodman, 
2009). We excluded a company’s observations where fixed capital was negative or equal to 
zero or where sales were negative (0.09% of all observations), as well as companies with a 
permanent negative mean operating income for the whole period (2.2% of all observations). 
Companies with a rate of accumulation (I/K) higher than 2.5 during the period were 
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excluded (0.7% of all observations), as well as companies with an increase in sales higher 
than 200% (0.3% of all observations). These two specific exclusions were informed by the 
need to avoid taking into account mergers or acquisitions in the companies considered. This 
procedure is consistent with the one employed in other world-leading publications using the 
same database (see among others Bloom et al., 2004), as well as in the key contribution by 
Love (2003) on the impact of financial development, to which our paper presents an 
alternative in terms of addressing the relevance of financialisation. Finally, observations in 
the upper and lower 1% of each variable’s distribution were excluded. This means that in 
this step we excluded the observations but not the company. Table 2A in the appendix shows 
descriptive statistics of our sample. 
Figure 1 shows the trends in the additions to fixed assets as a ratio to operating 
income in both the European aggregate as a whole and in selected economies. A common 
feature of the last twenty years has been a reduction in the reinvestment of the profit of the 
NFCs in the majority of the countries between 1995 and 2015. Overall, the slowdown in 
investment has been remarkable in Europe, with a 32% decline in the re-investment rate on 
average; whereas NFCs were investing about 33% of their profits as of 2015, this ratio was 
50% in 1995.  The highest falls were in Sweden (-49%), the UK (-32%), and Italy (-28%).   
<Figure1 here> 
<Figure 2 here> 
 The ratio of financial assets to fixed assets clearly increased, albeit with some 
differences (Figure 2); on average in Europe, the ratio increased by 93%; as of 2015 NFCs 
financial assets are 3.3 times their fixed assets in Europe.  Sweden, the UK and Germany 
experienced the strongest rise in this ratio (423%, 324%, and 285%, respectively).    
Figure 3 shows that during 1995-2015 the NFCs’ rate of capital accumulation (I/K) 
has been stagnant around an average value of 24%. At the same time, NFCs’ financial 
payments (dividends plus interest as a ratio to fixed assets) have been increasing 
significantly. There is also a sharp increase in their non-operating income (as a ratio to fixed 
assets) before the crisis (173%). The 2007-8 crisis has led to a reversal in the NFCs’ financial 
income, although they are slowly recovering towards the levels of the early 2000s.  
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<Figure 3 here> 
The last part of this section presents the degrees of financial development (FD), based 
on a widely used index computed for the 14 countries analysed. The FD index is a 
combination of standardised measures of five components, namely market capitalisation as 
a ratio to GDP, total value traded as a ratio to GDP, total value traded as a ratio to market 
capitalisation, ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, and credit to the private sector as a ratio to 
GDP.13 The source of these variables is the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) 
of the World Bank. We split the European countries into two groups, ‘high’ and ‘low’ FD, 
according to their median FD value from 1995 to 2007, excluding the years after the financial 
crisis. Figure 4 shows the values of the FD index for the countries included in our analysis.  
The countries with relatively highly developed financial systems are the UK, Spain, 
Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands and France; countries with relatively low levels of 
financial development are Ireland, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Austria, and Greece.14 
<Figure 4 here> 
As discussed before, the aggregate index of FD aims at synthesising the development of 
a country’s financial markets and intermediaries.  Figure 5 presents the growth rates of the 
separate components of the FD index for six major economies in our sample. The first column 
presents the average growth rates for the aggregate index. Spain experienced the strongest 
increase in this measure in the period considered, whilst France had the lowest rate of growth 
in the FD within this group. Looking at the growth rates of the five components, it appears that 
the main source of variation in FD is the changes in the ‘stock market total value traded as a 
ratio to GDP’ and the ‘stock market turnover ratio’, notwithstanding some difference across 
countries. These two elements characterise respectively the ‘activity’ and ‘liquidity’ of a 
country’s stock markets. In particular, the stock market total value traded equals to total shares 
traded on the stock market exchange divided by GDP, whilst share turnover is a measure 
of stock liquidity calculated by dividing the total number of shares traded over a period by the 
average number of shares outstanding. In this respect, it is important to highlight how, in the 
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European countries during the period considered, the increase in financial development was 
mainly driven by components related to stock market activity, rather than by the development 
of financial intermediaries (i.e. the provision of credit). 
<Figure 5 here> 
To summarise, the stylised facts hint at: a) stagnant or declining rates of investment; 
b) declining rates of reinvestment of profits; c) an increase in the overall importance of
financial assets and financial income as well as financial payments both in the European 
aggregate and in the majority of the economies; d) a certain degree of heterogeneity among 
countries in terms of financial development, in particular related to financial market activity 
and liquidity. The impact of these trends on investment will be investigated further via 
econometric estimations below. 
5. Estimation methodology
The four specifications presented in Section 3 are estimated using a difference-GMM 
estimator based on a dynamic panel-data model (Arellano and Bond, 1991). GMM is a 
powerful tool for analysis based on firm-level ‘small time/large observations’ samples, and 
for controlling for endogeneity (Roodman, 2009).  This allows us to address dual causality, 
if rising financial payments and income are also a consequence of the slowdown in 
investment, as well as the endogeneity created by the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable, which is also needed to address the autocorrelation issue. The final specifications 
are chosen based on the combination of instruments and a vector of parameters that shows 
the minimum correlation between the error term and the instruments.  The equations to be 
estimated do not explicitly include firm fixed effects; however, the difference-GMM estimator 
accounts for firm effects by first differencing explanatory variables. Therefore, the estimates 
are determined by the time dimension of the panel data as is almost exclusively the case in 
the related literature. 
We perform three types of tests on the estimation results. First, we apply the 
Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation (Arellano and Bond, 1991).  Second, 
we verify the validity of the instruments set through the Hansen test (Hansen, 1982). Third, 
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we incorporate time effects to account for shocks that are common to all firms in a specific 
year, and test the joint significance of the time dummies by using a Wald test. 
In all models, both the lagged dependent variable and all the explanatory variables 
enter the instrument set as endogenous regressors. Consistently with the structure of the 
GMM estimator, all the variables in the different specifications are instrumented using the 
second and third lags of the specific variables, whilst the year-dummy variables are included 
in the exogenous set of instruments. 
All the variables are in logarithmic form to allow for non-linear relationships between 
the dependent and the explanatory variables, and to control for heteroscedasticity. Robust 
standard errors are calculated through a two-step procedure after a finite-sample correction 
(Windmeijer, 2005).  
All the estimations come from weighted regression, where the weight for a firm in a 
specific country is equal to 1 divided by the number of available observations in that country. 
This follows an established procedure (see for example Love, 2003) and mitigates any bias 
that may be due to higher data availability for specific countries.  
Finally, a general-to-specific estimation procedure is applied, thus dropping from the 
specification the explanatory variable with the highest level of statistical insignificance at 
each step to arrive at a specification with only significant variables (Campos et al., 2005). By 
doing this we reach the most parsimonious lag structures for different specifications. 
6. Estimation results
This section presents our estimation results based on the four equations discussed in Section 
3. First, we discuss our basic findings at the aggregate level. Second, we focus on our findings
when the degree of financial development is included as a macroeconomic ‘control’ variable. 
Table 1 presents the estimation results for the aggregate pool of all 14 European 
countries based on equations (1) and (2). As can be seen in column one, the lagged rate of 
capital accumulation, sales, and net operating profit have positive effects on investment, as 
expected. Aggregate financial payments (dividends and interest) as well as non-operating 
financial income (πF/K) and indebtedness all have significantly negative effects on 
investment. These results are robust to the inclusion of Tobin’s Q as an additional control 
variable, which has the expected positive sign. The results indicate that both financial 
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payments and income have negatively affected NFCs’ investment in Europe. The results are 
consistent with previous research for both the US and developing countries (e.g. Orhangazi, 
2008; Demir, 2009). Column two presents the results for the same specification, but for the 
period prior to the 2008 financial crisis.  Overall, the results are robust, with an increase in 
the negative effect of financial payments (F/K).15 
As already discussed, theoretically the sign of the effect of non-operating income on 
physical investment is ambiguous. On the one hand, relatively small companies may use this 
additional source of income to partially ease liquidity constraints. On the other hand, the 
larger and more flexible companies may see short-term and reversible financial investment 
as an attractive alternative to physical investment. This choice may then come at the expense 
of long-term physical investment, and thus have an adverse effect on the investment of these 
large corporations. We explored this possible dual, non-linear effect, by including an 
interaction dummy variable to account for the potentially different effect of financial income 
with respect to the size of the company (in terms of total assets). In these alternative 
specifications as described in equation (2), in Section 3.3, the coefficient associated with the 
financial payments variable (πF/K) shows the relative effect for the companies in the top of 
the distribution. To compute the elasticity for the remaining companies we sum the 
coefficient for (πF/K)*Dn with the coefficient for πF/K, and then check for statistical 
significance of the new measure with a Wald test.  
<Table 1 here> 
The evidence suggests that the impact of financial income is non-linear with respect 
to company size. Column three of Table 1 presents the results for the specification including 
a dummy that is 0 if the company lies in the top 80% and 1 if it is in the lowest20 % of the 
distribution in terms of total assets. There is a statistically significant difference between the 
large and small companies with respect to the impact of financial income. In particular, the 
top 80% of the companies, in terms of size, experience a strong negative effect of financial 
income (-0.12), while for the firms in the lowest 20% of the sample, the effect is positive 
(0.16). In contrast, the negative effect of financial payments is stronger in relatively smaller 
firms (-0.19 vs. -0.05). Financial income crowds out physical investment for the top 80% of 
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the companies whilst smaller companies’ investments suffer more from financial payments. 
Columns four and five of Table 1 present results for the same specification, but with two 
alternative thresholds, namely a 50-50 split, and a split aimed at identifying differences 
between the top 20% and the remaining 80% of the distribution (this means the opposite of 
the first split described above). The identification of different behaviour in smaller 
companies is confirmed; looking at the coefficients of the interaction dummies in these 
alternative specifications, it is possible to see that the coefficient for financial payments is 
still positive for small companies but it decreases in magnitude as we enlarge the pool of the 
small companies (0.16, 0.08, and 0.06). At the same time, the companies in the top 20% of 
the distribution (Column five) experienced the strongest negative effect of financial incomes 
on investment (-0.34). The effect of financial payments appears to be particularly negative 
for firms in the bottom 20% of the distribution (-0.19), and is relatively low in absolute 
values in the other two specifications (-0.14). 
Table 2 presents the results based on equations (3), (4), and (5).16 These estimations 
provide evidence about the effects of the development of the financial system on European 
NFCs’ physical investment. As discussed before, the conventional arguments suggest that FD 
is good for companies’ investment due to an enhanced allocation of resources (Levine, 2005) 
and reduced cash flow constraints (Love, 2003; Love and Zicchino, 2006). However, to the 
best of our knowledge, the novel features of NFCs’ investment behaviour, i.e. the impact of 
their growing non-operational financial activities, has so far not been considered in the 
literature.  
Column one of Table 2 shows the results for specification (3) for the European pool. 
Here we interact NFCs’ financial income (πF/K) with a dummy that takes value 1 if company 
i is based in a country characterised by a low FD index, and zero otherwise. In order to better 
characterise our specification, this interaction also applies to retained earnings, financial 
payments, and change in total debt, and the interpretation is the same.  
Similar to the results presented in Table 1, the positive effects of the lagged 
investment, sales, and retained earnings are confirmed. In addition, we find that the effect of 
retained earnings is significantly stronger in companies operating in an environment with 
relatively low financial development (0.59 vs. 0.04). This confirms the previous findings on 
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the positive effect of FD in easing NFCs’ financing constraint (see especially Love, 2003 and 
Love and Zicchino, 2006).  
<Table 2 here> 
With respect to the effect of financial income, for companies based in countries with 
high FD the effect is highly negative (-0.27).  In contrast, a lower degree of FD is associated 
with a positive, yet small, effect of financial income on investment (0.08). In addition, the 
negative effect of financial payments on the NFCs’ investment is more than triple in less 
financially developed, i.e. more financially constrained, countries (-0.22 vs. -0.07). In 
addition, companies in countries with lower FD experienced a stronger negative effect of 
indebtedness (-0.09 vs. -0.02). 
Column two of Table 2 shows the results for the same estimation for the period of 
1995-2007. Even though the sign of the various effects is the same, the positive effect of 
financial income for companies in countries with low FD is higher with respect to the full 
period (0.12 vs. 0.04). In addition, in the period prior to the crisis, the increase in total debt 
had a small positive effect on the investment of these companies (0.03).
Column three of Table 2 presents the results obtained by estimating equation (4). In 
this case, we introduce both the size-dummies and FD-dummies, to test for the differences 
in the impact of financial income with respect to the size of the companies in the context of 
different levels of FD. The signs of the lagged dependent variable and sales are consistent 
with what was discussed before. Operating income had a small positive effect for companies 
in countries with high FD, whilst its effect is larger for companies in countries with low FD. 
This can be seen as further confirmation of the higher financial constraint experienced by 
companies based in an environment with less developed provisions of financial services.  
Interestingly, when differentiating by both size and the level of FD at the same time, 
two other outcomes emerge; the effect of financial income on investment is negative in both 
large and small companies in countries with high FD, and the effect is positive for both small 
and large companies in countries with low FD. However, the size of the positive effect for 
large companies is close to zero.  
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With respect to financial payments, the estimated effect on investment is significant 
and negative only for large companies, in countries with both low and high levels of FD. In 
the small companies in both country groups the effect is statistically insignificant; i.e. small 
companies seem not to suffer from the SVO and from the potential negative impact of the 
cost of capital. 
As before, Column four of Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of the same 
specification for the pre-crisis period. The effect of financial income for large companies in 
countries with low FD now becomes statistically insignificant. This effect is still positive and 
significant for small companies in countries with low FD. The insignificant effect of financial 
payments on smaller companies is confirmed also for the period before the 2007 crisis. 
Furthermore, given the p-value of the Wald test (p = 0.329), in this period the effect of debt 
for companies in countries with low FD is insignificant. 
Column five of Table 2 presents our results for the estimation of equation (5), in 
which we test the presence of a ‘threshold’ effect of financial development on ‘financialised’ 
investment in Europe. To do this, we added the level of Financial Development, and its 
square, as a continuous variable.17  The results show that the relationship between financial 
development and NFCs’ investment in our sample is indeed non-linear and concave. This 
means that up to a certain threshold financial development has a positive effect (the 
estimated coefficient for FD is equal to 0.295), whilst beyond that threshold the effect is 
negative (the estimated coefficient for FD-squared is equal to -0.214). Lagged investment, 
sales, and retained profits maintain the usual signs. Financial payments still negatively affect 
investment, whilst financial incomes are insignificant. In line with our previous conclusion, 
these results show that, in a financialised context, financial development and companies’ 
financial incomes have similar non-linear effects.  


































To find the maximum of the parabolic function, i.e. the level at which the relationship 
between FD and investment turns negative, we simply set the first derivative18 of equation 
(5.a) equal to zero (see equation 5.b). Equation (5.c) shows the condition with the estimated 
coefficients substituting the general parameters: 
Solving for FD, we calculate the threshold value of FD index as 0.54. This is the 
standardised value of FD beyond which the effect of financial development on NFCs’ 
investment turns negative.19 Converting this standardised value of the FD index to the 
average level of financial development (which, as described in Section 4, is the average of the 
level of developments of stock markets and intermediaries), we calculate the threshold value 
of FD to be 120%. This means that in the period considered, when the overall FD reached a 
level above 120% of GDP, it had a negative effect on NFCs’ investment. This level is in line 
with those computed by Law and Singh (2014) and Arcand et al. (2015). 
Next, we discuss the economic significance of our estimates. We compute the long-
run elasticities by dividing each short-run elasticity by one, minus the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable. Multiplying the long-run coefficient by the actual cumulative 
change in each variable for the estimation period, we get the corresponding economic effect. 
We compute the economic effects based on elasticities estimated for the period 1995-2007, 
thus excluding the impact of the financial crisis, after which financial activities were severely 
affected. First, the economic effect based on estimation of the baseline specification (1) will 
be presented and discussed. Second, we discuss the economic effects for specification (4), 
which highlight the different patterns arising when the disaggregation in terms of size and 
financial development are introduced. 












= 0.213 + 2 ∙ (−0.197) ∙ 𝐹𝐷 = 0 
(5.c) 
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<Table 3 here> 
Sales (capacity utilisation) have been the main determinant of accumulation in all 
countries with high FD, with an average economic effect of 0.26. Among countries with high 
FD, Sweden had the highest contribution of sales (0.54), whilst Spain had the lowest (0.04). 
Given a higher long-run coefficient of operating income for countries with low FD (0.37), 
internal funds have been the main determinant in this group.  The average economic effect 
of operating income (excluding Greece for which the long-run coefficient is positive but the 
actual cumulative change has been negative) is 0.35, with the lowest value in Portugal (0.06) 
and the highest in Belgium (0.53). The comparison of the economic effects of sales and 
operating income in contexts with different levels of FD shows that NFCs’ investment tends 
to be constrained by demand when FD is high, and more by liquidity in countries with a lower 
level of FD. At the country level, the crowding-out effects of financial incomes on investment 
(inward financialisation) are confirmed for NFCs in countries with a high level of FD. With a 
long-run elasticity of -0.37, and an average cumulative change of 1.04 in the period 
considered, the average economic effect is equal to -0.38. Sweden and the UK experienced 
the two highest negative effects (respectively -0.71 and -0.50), whilst NFCs’ investment in 
Spain and France suffered less from crowding out (respectively -0.26 and -0.16). In contrast, 
we found that financial incomes provided additional funds for NFCs based in the group of 
countries with relatively low FD. However, this positive effect is small in most of the 
countries. This is mainly due to an average cumulative change of 0.34, which is three times 
lower than the changes in countries with high FD. The average positive economic effect is 
equal to 0.07, with NFCs’ investment in Portugal as the main beneficiaries of financial 
receipts (0.26). The adverse economic effect of financial payments (outward 
financialisation) is generally present regardless of level of FD. However, in this case the NFCs 
in countries with a lower level of FD experienced the strongest negative effect of financial 
payments (interest plus dividends), with an average effect of -0.18. This effect is low in 
general in countries with high FD, (-0.17), with again Sweden and UK being the most 
negatively affected countries (-0.24 and -0.13 respectively). As it is clear from the last column 
of Table 3, the effect of the change in indebtedness on investment is zero in countries with 
low FD (due to an insignificant estimated elasticity). In addition, in NFCs experiencing a 
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higher level of FD, this effect is not large, though it is negative in the majority of these 
countries (the exceptions are Finland and Sweden). This is due to both a small long-run 
coefficient (-0.05) and actual cumulative changes (except in Sweden and the UK). 
 Table 4 presents the economic effects based on the results showed in Table 2 
(specification 4). The economic impacts of our two financialisation channels (and 
indebtedness) also account for the differences in the companies’ size and levels of financial 
development in the country.  
<Table 4 here> 
 
Again, sales are the main determinant of NFCs investment in countries with a high 
level of FD (except Belgium), whilst operating income played a less important role. In 
countries with lower FD demand and internal finance measures have similar importance for 
the NFCs’ investment. Notwithstanding this, the stronger liquidity constraint experienced by 
companies in countries with relatively lower FD is confirmed.  
Our findings suggest that the negative economic effect of financial payments has been 
particularly strong for the NFCs in counties with a high level of FD. Moreover, there is no 
positive effect of financial income on small NFCs’ investment.  
 In countries with a high level of FD the crowding-out impact of financial revenues on 
investment is effective for both large and small companies. Even though the negative long-
run elasticities are higher for large companies (-0.36 vs. -0.20), on average, the negative 
economic effect in the small companies is similar to that in the large ones (-0.33 vs. -0.31). 
This is due to the very high increases in small companies’ financial income. The highest 
negative effects in the large companies are evident in Sweden and the UK (-0.47 and -0.41, 
respectively). In countries with a low level of FD, the effect of financial income on the large 
companies’ investment is insignificant. However, small companies’ investment benefited 
from increasing financial income, with Ireland and Belgium at the top. In Austria and 
Portugal, given an actual reduction in financial income, the economic effect of non-operating 
income is negative for the small companies as well. 
To summarise, whilst the effect of financial payments is similarly negative for almost 
all the countries analysed, the impact of financial income is more varied. In fact, in countries 
in which financial markets and intermediaries are highly developed, the NFCs’ increasing 
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engagements in financial investment had an adverse effect on their investment in fixed 
capital.  
6.1 Robustness tests  
We estimated the different specifications using different measures for operating 
income, which appears to be the less robust variable across the results (also at country level). 
First, we deducted depreciation from the operating income. Second, after-tax operating 
income has been used to control for potential bias generated by different taxation systems 
in Europe. Third, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as well as earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) were used as measures of 
profitability. In general, all these alternative measures did not add explanatory 
power/significance to the estimated specifications and, in most of the cases, introduced 
collinearity with respect to the other control variables (especially in the case of ‘sales over 
fixed capital’, which became insignificant). 
As previously discussed, the phenomenon of share buybacks could be another 
interesting aspect of firms’ financial activities. Hence, we also performed an estimation 
including the value of companies’ share buybacks as an additional explanatory variable. The 
estimated coefficients for share buybacks were statistically insignificant across different 
specifications. Given the reduction in the sample due to lack of data for this variable, the 
explanatory power of the estimated models was also not adequate.20  
With respect to the effect of debt, we also used the alternative variables of only short-
term debt, or only long-term debt, instead of total debt. They were never significant. We also 
included total debt over fixed capital as an explanatory variable to overcome the 
multicollinearity issues when interacting this variable with firms’ size. Again, this variable 
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was insignificant, and reduced the significance of the financial payments variable in the 
baseline specification. With respect to the selection of the sample itself, the comparison of 
weighted regressions and single country estimations were important steps to check for the 
overall consistency of our results.  As expected, there is a positive effect of lagged investment, 
sales and retained earnings in each country. The negative crowding-out effect of financial 
income is a robust significant finding in all countries. Even though a straight comparison 
between estimates may be statistically distorted, we find the strongest negative effect of non-
operating income in the NFCs in Sweden and France (-0.17 and -0.13 respectively). Financial 
payments have a negative effect on the NFCs’ investment in all countries apart from Italy and 
Sweden, where we did not find a significant effect. Overall, these single country estimations 
confirm our previous findings of a negative impact of both financial income and payments 
on NFCs’ investment based on the pool of European firms. In addition, the negative effect of 
financial income is common to all countries with different levels of FD.  
Table 3A summarises the additional robustness test that we implemented. The first 
column presents the results for the estimation of our baseline model (equation 1) excluding 
Tobin’s Q as an explanatory variable. We confirm that our results are robust to the exclusion 
of this variable. 
Column two of Table 3A presents an estimation of the baseline specification with the 
disaggregation of the aggregate financial payments variable used in the main regressions. In 
fact, interest and dividends payments may capture different mechanisms; dividend 
payments are a non-required expenditure (SVO), whereas interest payments are obligatory 
and reduce internal funds directly. We find a negative, albeit insignificant, effect of the two 
variables. We thus opt for the aggregate measure, which is, moreover, comparable with 
previous studies (in particular see Orhangazi, 2008).  
Columns three and four present the results of a robustness test performed on the 
interacted measure of FD. While financial development was used as a binomial variable in 
Table 3, here the two financialisation variables are interacted with the continuous measure 
of FD (𝐹𝐷𝑐) at the country level for the pre-crisis period. These results confirm once again 
how financial development has been an institutional driver for European NFCs’ 
financialisation, exacerbating the negative effects of both financial incomes and payments on 
firm-level investment. Contrary to what was found with the specification using the binomial 
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variable to reflect FD, here the interacted variable accounting for the financial constraints is 
not statistically significant.  
Columns five and six of Table 3A present estimations of the baseline specification 
(without Tobin’s Q) with the variables in levels as opposed to logs. The baseline results 
about the negative effects of financialisation on investment presented previously are valid 
also when variables are measured in levels. On top of the heteroscedasticity issues 
discussed in Section 4, we nevertheless decided to employ the log-log specification for three 
main reasons: a) this specification allows for more meaningful interpretation of effects as 
elasticities (percentage change), which is also useful for the computation of economic effects; 
b) it allows for direct comparison with previous micro-level studies about financialisation
and in particular with Orhangazi (2008); c) this form proved to be more robust (especially 
in terms of auto-correlation and Hansen tests)  across the different specifications and 
interactions. In fact, our conclusion about the interactions between the FD index and our 
financialisation variables are not robust when specifications with variables in levels are 
employed. This might be due to the fact that the variable distribution resulting from the log 
transformation had a better ft with the macro-variables that compose the Index of Financial 
Development. Notwithstanding this issue, the evidence from our log-log approach remains 
relevant even if the results in levels appear to be less robust. 
Finally, the last column of Table 3A presents the results for our baseline specification 
for the pre-crisis period, with an alternative method of dealing with outliers. In this case, we 
excluded the upper and lower 2% of the distributions for each variable used in the 
estimations. We find that our main results are robust to our preferred and widely used 
cleaning process (i.e. excluding the top and bottom 1% of the distribution). 
Another driver for the negative relationship between NFCs financial activities and 
investment could be ‘optimal assets allocation’, for which we should witness an increase in 
financial activities in declining industries with decreasing opportunities for profitability, but 
not in growing ones. If this is the case, what we identified as ‘financialisation’ could simply 
reflect transfers of capital from less to more profitable sectors of the economy rather than a 
negative effect of financialisation on investment in the declining industries. To explore the 
plausibility of this mechanism we introduced a sectoral dummy to our baseline estimation 
(equation 1), a similar exercise to the one with the size effects. Using the SIC classification, 
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we identified eight sectors to test for differences in the effects relative to other sectors in 
separate estimations. If the company is part of sector ‘x’, the (sectoral) dummy variable will 
be equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. As before, if significant, the estimated coefficient for the sector 
will be equal to the sum of the interacted and the non-interacted coefficients.  
The results for these estimations are presented in Table 4A. Overall, our evidence 
seems not to support an ‘optimal assets allocation’ process.21 In fact, looking in particular at 
the estimated effects of financial incomes on investment, even though this is more negative 
in Agriculture, Foresting and Fishing (full period), Mining experienced a positive effect of 
financial incomes on investment (both in the pre-crisis and in the full periods). In addition, 
we do find evidence of an enhanced crowding-out effect of financial incomes in Wholesale, 
and in the Services sectors (both only for the pre-crisis period). Regarding the effects of 
financial payments at the sectoral level, three sectors show an even more negative effect of 
this channel on NFCs’ investment Agriculture: Fishing and Foresting; Mining; and 
Transportation Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services. These results at the 
sectoral level partially support the findings discussed above relating to the aggregate sample, 
and do not suggest the presence of a spurious relationship between NFCs’ financialisation 
and investment.  
Finally, with respect to what we described as ‘size effect’ (see Table 1), another 
possibility could have been to interact the firm size variable itself with the explanatory 
variables. This approach imposes linearity on the size interaction but a quadratic term could 
have been included to make the specification more general. We explored this possibility but 
we did not find significant results for the interacted variables, and this could be due to the 
different distribution of total assets in the countries considered. As discussed before, 
regarding the different effects of financial incomes with respect to size, the positive effect on 
investment seems to be economically relevant for a relatively small fraction of firms. 
7. Conclusions
This paper provides a novel framework for modelling the impact of financialisation on 
investment and presents new micro-econometric evidence on the relationship between 
financial development and firm-level investment in Europe, using data from publicly listed 
NFCs. In particular, the focus is on three aspects. Firstly, even though higher income from 
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financial activities can relax NFCs’ cash flow constraints, they can adversely affect 
investment by crowding out physical investments. Secondly, increasing financial payments 
for external finance and orientation towards shareholders (i.e. rising interest and dividend 
payments) may reduce the NFCs’ internal funds, and thus investment. Thirdly, even though 
financial development may allow efficient allocation of investment resources, it can also 
suppress investment in fixed assets. In this respect, our analysis shows how financial 
development can be understood as an ‘institutional driver’ for speculative pressures in the 
European non-financial corporate sector, especially for relatively large companies. 
Our findings for Europe provide at least two key insights on the relationship between 
means of financing and NFCs’ investment. First, at the aggregate level, the increasing reliance 
on external financing, shareholder value orientation and the substitution of fixed investment 
by financial activity, has had a fundamentally negative impact on investment of the NFCs in 
the last few decades. The decreasing availability of internal funds constrains investment 
decisions. On the one hand, the increase in financial payments (interest and dividend 
payments) have a negative effect on investment while on the other hand, the negative 
crowding-out effects of financial activities on investment more than offset the gains from 
relaxing cash flow constraints. Financial income has a positive effect on investment only for 
small companies, but a significant negative effect in large companies. This can be due to the 
need for additional sources of financing by the more cash-constrained companies, especially 
in contexts in which the financial system is relatively ‘less developed’. It has to be noted that 
larger companies create the vast majority of capital, and the crowding out of physical 
investment of these companies by financial activity is a substantial drag on the investment 
performance and productivity of the European countries.  
Second, our results suggest that, even though at low levels of financial development 
an increase in financial development has a positive effect on investment through enhanced 
resource allocation, in countries with high levels of financial development a perverse effect 
dominates. Financial development further aggravates the adverse effects of both inward and 
outward financialisation at high levels of financial development. The growth of financial 
markets and intermediaries delinked from the financing requirements of the NFCs 
incentivises the latter to engage heavily in non-operating activities, ultimately leading to 
stagnant levels of investment. We present robust evidence of a negative effect of financial 
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development (as measured by the FD index) on NFCs’ investment via an amplified crowding-
out effect of financial income. When companies’ financial (non-operating) activities are taken 
into account, the virtuous cycle between FD and investment described in Love and Zicchino 
(2006) is not confirmed. On the contrary, our results suggest that a higher level of FD may 
induce NFCs to accumulate more financial assets, receive non-operational income, and use 
this liquidity to buy additional financial assets as opposed to physical assets related to their 
core business. Our findings at the microeconomic level highlight a further mechanism 
through which financial development beyond a certain threshold may negatively affect 
investment behaviour, in line with some new reservations put forward in the more recent 
macroeconomic literature (e.g. Arcand et al., 2015). 
The effects of financialisation differ with respect to the size of the firm as well as the 
level of financial development in the country. Our results show a negative effect on interest 
and dividend payments, in particular for large companies in all countries, irrespective of the 
level of financial development.  However, a strong negative effect of financial income on 
investment characterises NFCs in countries with high levels of FD, whilst this impact is 
slightly positive, albeit economically negligible, for the NFCs in countries with low FD. The 
positive effect becomes more important for smaller NFCs, but only in countries with low FD. 
On the contrary, increasing financial income is crowding out physical investment in all NFCs 
within an environment of high FD, irrespective of their size. These findings challenge the 
conventional idea that ‘every additional fund is good for investment’. Our results confirm 
previous evidence of the negative effect of financialisation on investment (see among others 
Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008). In addition, our results are in line with, and give 
strength to, the analyses in which the crowding-out effect of financial activity is not limited 
to fixed investment but also puts negative pressure on economic growth, tax contribution 
(Tomaskovic-Devey, et al. 2015) and employment levels (Lin, 2016). More importantly, our 
results challenge the conventional evidence about the absolute positive effect of financial 
development on investment. In particular, when the ‘financialised’ behaviour of corporations 
is taken into account, the results presented in Love (2003) are not only disproved, but 
overturned.  
Our results support the theoretical arguments regarding the negative effects of 
financialisation and confirm previous empirical findings at the macro- and 
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microeconomic levels in the literature for the US economy. The increasing interrelations 
between the financial markets and the NFCs are progressively reducing fixed capital 
accumulation, and thus economic growth. The results based on the specifications including 
financial development and different financialisation channels are, to the best of our 
knowledge, one of the novelties of this paper. Even though our results indicate that a more 
developed financial system is easing NFCs’ financial constraints, the inclusion of financial 
activities allowed us to uncover another effect that is not discussed in the literature; in fact, 
a more developed financial system is at the same time enabling NFCs to engage in financial 
activities (receiving financial income), which are crowding out their core business, namely 
physical investment. Our results contrast with the conventional arguments regarding the 
beneficial effects of financial liberalization and financial deepening. Our analysis focuses on 
the broad evolution of the European financial structure in different countries as a potential 
‘institutional’ determinant of the firm-level financialisation-investment nexus. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the conventional methodology based on the FD index 
and the subsequent country grouping, our results reiterate that in future research, which 
analyses the process of financialisation, it will be paramount to consider indicators of the 
broad institutional context in which the investment decisions of NFCs take place (Roberts 
and Kwon, 2017).  
The financialisation of the European economic and social system has been favoured 
by political processes aimed at the deregulation (liberalization) of financial markets and at 
the reduction of tax rates for corporations (Bieling, 2013). As we have seen, financialisation 
has had a fundamental role in depressing NFCs’ investment in Europe. To reach a stable and 
vigorous dynamic of investment, a de-financialisation of the non-financial sector is desirable. 
This would require an extended regulation of companies’ non-operating financial activities 
along with financial regulation. In addition, the estimated robust connection between past 
and present rates of investment (i.e. the ‘hysteresis’ of the investment processes) increases 
the potential effectiveness of de-financialisation economic policies. 
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Given the negative effect of excessive financial development on NFCs’ investment, the 
recommendation for countries with low levels of FD would be not to intensify the de-
regulation of financial markets and/or intermediaries, and to avoid the negative effect 
associated with high levels of FD. In addition, a wider interpretation of fiscal policy can be 
effective in reversing the financialisation-led investment depletion. Apart from the re-
regulation of the financial side of our economies (both at the macro and at the micro levels), 
the reform of a financialised productive system requires coordinated public investments. In 
fact, the public sector can act as the catalyst and driver of a new phase in which NFCs’ 
objectives are essentially brought back to productive and stable accumulation. The main 
reason behind the missing link between profits and accumulation can be traced back to the 
consistent rise in the ‘financialisation-inequality mix’ (Stockhammer, 2015). The various 
waves of liberalization and privatisation of large parts of the economics systems have 
fostered the emergence of behaviours detached from the objectives of equality and 
prosperity. The evidence speaks in favour of a vast programme of public investment that can 
sustain and provide a sustainable direction to the private initiative (Onaran, 2016).  
Notwithstanding the above considerations, at the (broader) level of analysis of the 
political projects guiding the recent development of European financial capitalism, an issue 
of critical reassessment of the process of European (financial) integration remains (Bieling 
2003, 2013). In fact, the project of European economic integration has been informed by a 
set of concepts about the functioning of economic systems for which ‘the market’ is 
portrayed as the primary driver of growth, economic stability and prosperity. Although this 
belief has proven to be too optimistic, especially after the 2007-8 financial meltdown and its 
consequences on European economies, this view still has strong support. Reversing 
financialisation of the socio-economic system in general, and of NFCs accumulation in 
particular, would require an extensive socio-political ‘de-financialisation reform package’, 
which goes beyond the unconventional monetary and/or fiscal policies. 
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Endnotes 
1 See Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and the responses by Fazzari et al. (2000), Almeida and Campello (2007), 
and Hadlock and Pierce (2010). 
2 Another channel in which financialisation affects the ‘real’ economy is via its pressures on labour market 
institutions (Darcillon, 2015), and the wage share (Alvarez, 2015; Kohler et al., 2018). There is evidence 
that financialisation reduces both workers’ bargaining power and wage levels. 
3 For a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature on financialisation and investment see Davis 
(2017). 
4 We use the approximate average measure for Tobin’s Q suggested by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and 
Chung and Pruitt (1994:71. See Table 1A in the Appendix for a detailed description. This measure is also 
used in Love and Zicchino (2006), who use the same database as in this paper. Although this variable 
showed variability in terms of explanatory power, we decided to include it given that this can provide a 
good comparison with the mainstream literature, testing the role of asset prices on investment while 
taking into account NFCs’ financialisation and countries’ financial development. Moreover, the average 
value of Tobin’s Q for the period considered is 1.5, providing an interesting argument against the claim 
that the fall in investment could be the cause of financialisation, rather than the consequence. In fact, such 
a high value of Tobin’s Q reveals that investment opportunities have been far from scarce for the European 
NFCs in our sample. 
5 This follows the principle of cash flow accounting to measure retained earnings.  
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which is a measure of technology. With constant technology in the short run, time effects capture 
technological change. Thus, 
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 is often used as a measure of capacity utilisation due to a lack of data for 𝑌*.
7 Interest and dividends do not exhaust the spectrum of non-operating financial incomes of NFCs. 
Krippner (2005) shows how capital gains account for a considerable part of NFCs financial profits. 
However, as also recognised by Orhangazi (2008) with respect to the Compustat database, data on the 
NFCs’ capital gains are not available in Worldscope. 
8 The FD index is the sum of Index 1 and Findex 1 from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996). Index 1 
summarises the stock market development and is the sum of (standardised indices of) market 
capitalisation to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and turnover (i.e. total value traded/market 
capitalisation). Findex 1 accounts for the financial intermediary development and is the sum of 
(standardised indices of) ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (i.e. M3/GDP), and ratio of domestic credit to 
private sector to GDP. These indices are computed by using a simple standardisation formula.   
9 Using Index 1 and Findex 1 separately to distinguish different financial channels within the ‘bank based’ 
vs. ‘market-based’ economic systems is not helpful when employing an endogenous money approach. 
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10 Given that smaller companies are relatively more constrained in terms of liquidity, we could also expect 
these firms to value the flexibility derived from the opportunity of financial investments, such that there 
is a trade-off with fixed investment for small firms as financial investment opportunities increase. This is 
reflected by the level of financial development in our estimations.  
11 Given restricted data availability for the NFCs in Luxembourg, we excluded this country. 
12 Love (2003), Guariglia and Carpenter (2008), Love and Zichino (2006), Chirinko et al. (1999) and 
Orhangazi (2008) follow similar strategies to exclude outliers. 
13 See Beck et al. (2010) for a discussion and standard application of these measures.   
14 The classification described above is relative, and conditional on both the standardization process and 
the average level of FD computed among the countries included in the sample.  
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